German Army Reversable Winter Uniform

Reversible Winter Uniforms -Umkehrbare Winteranzug des Deutschen Heeres

Introduced during the winter of 1942-3 as the result of the bitter experiences of the previous winter when thousands of German troops fighting on the Eastern Front suffered from the extremes of cold.

These uniforms proved to be extremely comfortable and, as a combat uniform, they gave freedom of movement and use of equipment whilst at the same time affording protection against severe cold as well as overheating during periods of exertion.

Both patterns consisted of a heavy reversible double-breasted over jacket and matching over
trousers. The uniform and trousers were designed large enough to be worn over the normal Field Service Uniform including basic field equipment, although German troops favoured wearing their equipment over the Winter Jacket.

Because it was a completely reversible item of clothing, including the trousers, features such as
pockets, draw strings and buttons located on the camouflage or mouse-grey side were duplicated on the white side.


The jacket was double-breasted for extra frontal warmth, with double buttoned overlaps to the flaps of the jacket at the front which when securely fastened provided a windproof closure. There was a 'hidden' waist belt which could be gathered in around the wearer’s waist from the outside of whichever side of the jacket was being worn outermost. The bottom edge to the jacket also had a draw string and the ends of the cuffs were also adjustable. The jacket had long sleeves as well as an attached draw-string adjustable hood, also reversible. Six buttons were visible worn down the front of the coat and there was one button to each pocket flap on both sides of the coat 'skirt'.

These metal buttons were field-grey when used on the camouflaged/mouse-grey side of the coat and white painted on the white side. Two small fibre buttons were located approximately 20cm from the shoulder seam on both sleeves and positioned on the two seams of both jacket sleeves. These were intended to be used to button on the bands of coloured cloth used by forward German Forces to help identify friendly troops. Like passwords, these bands of cloth were changed every day and a new colour was used for this purpose.

This arrangement could be used on both sides of the jacket as the small fibre buttons were sewn on to the white side as well as the coloured side of the jacket. The trousers worn with this jacket were of the same quality, colouring and manufacture. They were shorter in the leg than normal cloth trousers and could be worn either tucked inside the German Army marching boots or worn over the top of the boots with the ends of the trousers gathered in by the draw strings and tied around the calf of the boots.

The trousers were extra thick, as was the jacket, and was completely reversible—which included the pockets. The buttons used on the trousers were large smooth black plastic ones each with four eye holes and used stitched on to both the camouflaged and the white side. There were built in braces made of white webbing. They were sewn into the waist of the trousers at the rear and crossed behind the wearer’s shoulder blades passing over the shoulders and being buttoned in the front on either side of the front opening. The braces were adjustable to one of three
positions on the front of the trousers.

The trousers had two reversible pockets with large reversible button down pocket flaps. There were four buttons used down the fly front. Two tapes were sewn into the rear of the waist to allow the waist band to be drawn in tight. There were tapes at the bottom of each trouser leg.

Both the mouse—grey and the camouflage reversible winter uniforms were identical in design and manufacture. Both patterns of German Army camouflage were used for the camouflaged version, i.e. the green splinter pattern and the tan water pattern.

No form of insignia decoration or badge other than the special rank insignia designed for this type of clothing was worn on this uniform.

Brian L. Davis, "German Army Uniforms and Insignia 1933-1945", The World Publishing Co., 1972

The German Army - Historical Background

It is probably safe to say that the German regular army was, in 1939, the most efficient national fighting force in the world. This was not necessarily because of its oft-quoted superiority of equipment, which was partly a propaganda myth that worked; the standard and really efficient equipment was in general only in small scale use right up to the end of the 1940 French campaign and even later. It was due more to the tradition of militarism in the German nation, a tradition that ensured even in peace time an excellent and forward-looking General Staff and an army and population whose patriotism, and hence their military morale, could be easily stirred; and to the above-mentioned propaganda element which gave extra strength to the advanced tactics that were being adopted. The exaggerated accounts of the opening campaign against Poland in 1939 hid the fact that the successful Blitzkrieg (lightning war) had been achieved with quite ordinary equipment for the period, and thus helped to confuse and dishearten the opposition when the same tactics were used in France the following year. French equipment then, especially in armor, was in many ways superior to equivalent German machines but the army organization was ineffective against the superb staff work and unexpected tactics of the Germans.

The basis of this military machine can be traced back to traditions of conscription and militarism, well before even the First World War, when the German General Staff never really thought of the army as having been defeated. This attitude, together with the resentment engendered by the Versailles treaty that among other things severely restricted weapons and armed forces, gave a boost to militarism that was showing results even before Hitler came to power in I933. With hindsight it would seem that the Versailles restrictions on armament in particular did much to pressure Germany into developing technically advanced equipment and tactics so that when the time came, an efficient army could be produced at short notice.

In consequence, through the late 1920s and early 1930s, in all arms basic equipment was being developed in civilian guises without the handicap of having to conserve existing material - the old story of the German worker who stole perambulator parts and found that on assembly they kept coming out as a machine gun, had more than a grain of truth in it. Certainly "commercial" car and lorry chassis turned suspiciously easily into military cross-country vehicles, while more potent weapons were actually developed and tested fairly openly in neighbouring countries. Thus when Hitler came to power and declared the creation of a revived armed services (die Wehrmacht) comprising das Heer(Army); die Luftwaffe (Air Force); die Kriegsmarine (Navy) the basic work had already been done in many cases. True, the development of battle tanks had been slowest as had the development of artillery - they were big things to hide in the finished form - but other equipment was almost ready for production.

Unfortunately the General Staff and the propaganda branch let themselves be carried away by their ideals. In 1936, for example the Einheits or standard vehichle programme provided for construction of a whole range of elaborate troop supply and weapons carriers most of which had cross-country capability and all of which were very expensive. It became rapidly obvious that to provide even the limited striking forces required by the new tactics would take far too long and be far too costly. A rapid revaluation had to be undertaken and in 1938 Colonel von Schell pushed through a revised equipment programme that drastically simplified army procurement and introduced common elements in both civilian and army vehicles.

Organisation and planning, on the other hand was not seriously inhibited by post-war restrictions and was pushed ahead urgently all through the inter-war period. Untouched by the "allied" concept of apparently preparing for the next war on the lines of the last, the German General staff seized on the ideas of the British Captain Liddel Hart who was advocating the development of armoured striking forces as the spearhead of an army. His concept was of the "expanding torrents", the smashing hammerblow through an enemy front by masses of armour and mobile infantry which protected its flanks simply by its own speed and by the disorganization it caused. The Germans developed this into the Blitzkrieg system which added to the tanks and infantry a force of ground attack aircraft to co-operate closely with the army and help to clear the way for the spearhead.

The thinking was sound; the snag was that, even with simplified equipment programmers German industry could not produce nearly enough offensive equipment to meet the army's needs. The original plan was for 63 armoured (Panzer) Divisions; at the end of 1939 there were but ten and in 1945 therewere only some 36, while it was impossible to keep even these fully equipped. Hence the Blitzkrieg concept virtually dictated the formation of the rest of the army. Apart from a limited number of motorized infantry divisions to back up the panzers, all infantry formations would have to rely mainly on horse drawn transport, being carried and supplied by rail over long distances. It was conordered that this was not of great importance since they were intended only as fairly static units, mopping up after the short sharp panzer war and garrisoning occupied districts. Time invalidated this theory but only because the blitzkrieg, while winning major battles, did not in Russia provide the short sharp war it was intended to do.

Nonetheless, none of this was apparent in 1939. The political side is not relevant here except where it affected the army as a fighting machine but it had by then contributed in several ways to army tactical efficiency. One major one was in the annexation of Czechoslovakia which, from the military point of view, provided mobilization practice and an efficient battle-tank to stop the gap until home-developed machines come along! More than a quarter of the tanks used in the 1940 French campaign were of Czech design. It had also, however, already started to reduce the independent decision-making power of the General Staff, a tendency that was eventually to subordinate military policy directly to the control of Hitler, and eventually to embarrass the army in many ways.

In the field, initially the Blltzkneg worked. With crushlng air superlority and the unexpected tactics of the lightning war, first the Poles in Autumn 1939 and then the French and British eight months later were caught unprepared and decisively defeated on land. The German army found itself master of western Europe with a reputation for high fighting power and advanced equipment. The paucity of such equipment was not noticed and the success in some part seems to have hidden its lack even from the German political leaders.

During the ensuing year, much improved equipment, both light and heavy, was in fact coming into service The main battle tanks Types III and IV, new infantry weaponry and tactics based upon the lessons learn were ready for the major turning point of the war - the opening of the Russian front in June 1941. Although it exposed Germany to that constant General Staff nightmare, a war on two major fronts, at first this appeared a feasible operation. The panzer tactics and the sweeping outflanking movements worked; the opposition was driven back in great leaps and bounds. But it also very soon revealed the two basic weaknesses that defeated the German army.

Firstly, it became quickly evident that production capacity was not sufficient to equip properly the rapid expansion made necessary by the vast distances of Russia; a situation made worse by operations in the Balkans and in Africa which drained off further resources. The non-mobile infantry Divisions in particular proved a considerable handicap and the Russian winter of 1941-2 showed up a new weak link - unpreparedness to face extremely low temperatures. The wastage in vehicles, equipment and men was enormous and continual. The Blitzkrieg for the first time failed and in doing so sealed the final military defeat.

Secondly the strictly military control of operations was over. Even during the summer of 1941, central OKH control had grown so weak that individual army group commanders were interfering in the strategic planning by initiating operations on their own; OKH was really emasculated when on December 19, 1941, Hitler took over direct command of the army and increasingly interfered in its activities. While the offensives were taking place this was not quite so serious but once, from late 1942 on, the army was forced on to the defensive on all fronts, its effects both on efficiency and morale became extremely serious. Hitler developed an obsession about not giving up ground which lost vast quantities of men and material that the army could not spare; Germany had only a very limited potential in a long war and such epic disasters as Stalingrad and Tunis where whole armies of 100,000 men and more were lost complete with their equipment were largely irremediable so far as army strength was concerned. In addition his reaction to the 'independence' of the Russian front generals was to tie their hands by far too detailed orders which often could not take into account the actual circumstances in the field.

Here the political side of the war machine was a crippling handicap to the better field commanders, as it was in the rise of the 'private armies' formed by various factions within the Nazi regime. The most well-known of these was the Waffen-SS (Schutzstaffel) the armed branch of the Nazi Party's own force. From 1943 on, the best equipment, the best fighting men, the most regular supplies, were directed into this army which totalled over 38 Divisions by the war's end. At its best it was an effective fighting force second to none, but for the army command it had serious disadvantages.

First and foremost its field commanders always had a direct line of communication to Nazi headquarters and hence to OKW - the supreme command of the Wehrmacht; there was always a struggle for control in the field so that army commanders could never entirely assimilate SS units within their commands. Secondly; its loyalty eventually was to its creator Heinrich Himmler and to Hitler, not to the army General staff. Thirdly; in its creator's quest for power it soon included a number of almost completely useless Divisions sometimes known as the joke SS or Byzantine SS, composed almost entirely of foreign nationals and criminals some of whom fought well but many of whom could be guaranteed to desert at the first opportunity; yet they still had to be employed in war and they still consumed valuable equipment.

On a lesser scale the same can be said for the field Divisions hastily formed during 1943-45, from redundant Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel. They were not trained to the standard of regular divisions, their equipment was not so good, and their former masters were always trying to keep some measure of control. Even the Volksturm, the last-ditch home guard that was blown up out of all proportion for political reasons by Martin Bormann - who wanted his own army - diverted some effort and equipment. As several commentators have said, it was a wonder that the poor regular army ever got any replacements at all!

On the credit side, however, political pressure had some rationalizing effect on development and production. From 1942 on, new and for its period very advanced, equipment began to reach the field, though never in sufficient quantity. Despite their teething troubles the new tanks, guns, infantry carriers and light infantry weapons were superior in design to equivalent allied equipment and it was only this superiority of designs coupled to the still efficient military machine and the resilience of the average German soldier, that enabled the army to fight on for so long. For, from the time of the successful allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the original defects of the Army ensured its eventual destruction.

Firstly, the basic lack of resources was emphasized by an ever increasing allied superiority in the air and an apparently inexhaustible allied source of equipment and manpower. If the Germans lost a thousand men or fifty tanks - or, more importantly, a fuel or ammunition dump - it was very difficult to replace them, especially as four fronts were calling for help. If the allies lost 1oo tanks another 1oo appeared as if by magic. Then, too, allied air superiority invalidated the German strategic defence pattern that had been forced on them by the split between mobile and largely immobile Divisions. On the western front, with rail traffic disrupted by air strikes, they could no longer easily move the horse drawnin fantry Divisions and had to rely on a crust defence backed by barely adequate mobile reserves. Yet allied air power also seriously hampered the mobility of these reserves. Petrol stores dropped rapidly and even heavy armour could not move safely in daylight. Thus even the panzer and motorized units, bled of much equipment for the Russian front, were drawn into the crust defence. It was a very hard crust to crack as the allies found at Caen and at Monte Casino, but once it broke there was little to hold advancing troops and, of more importance much equipment had to be abandoned through lack of transport. Matters were not made easier for the tactical commanders by Hitler's continued demands not to give ground, since it was then largely impossible to build up reserve lines or to conduct a proper strategic withdrawal.

On the Russian front, air superiority was never such a problem but the extremes of climate and the vast distances handicapped the German army in much the same way. There was never enough mobile transport or battle equipment and what there was wore out quickly. In the circumstances the German withdrawal was a good piece of tactical fighting since, until the Russians used Blitzkrieg tactics themselves in overwhelming strength in 1945, some sort of a front line was always maintained.

Perhaps the most amazing thing about the German army in fact is that, despite political interference, its losses and the impossibility of ever meeting its needs, it remained a cohesive organization up to the end of the war. This was partly helped by the increasingly strict combing out of civilian workers to supply manpower needs and by the staggering capacity of German industry to maintain high production totals even under the allied bombing. Nonetheless it was a considerable feat to be able to raise a mobile counter attack force of the size and quality that tried to burst through the Ardennes in December 1944. That the gamble failed through, almost inevitable the German weaknesses of political interference, lack of fuel and the superior capacity of the allied forces especially in the air, does not conceal the basic feat.

In summery, the German army in the 1939-45 war suffered from the startb y inadequate supplies of men and material. This would not have been vital had the Blitzkrieg philosophy always won campaigns instead of only major battles. But the Russian Blitzkrieg failed. From that time on the army was committed to a long drawn-out struggle on several fronts with inadequate mobility to maintain its front lines. The manpower and equipment situation was gravely worsened by political interference which threw away whole armies for militarily unsound reasons and this problem was compounded when the additional front was opened by the Allied Invasion of Europe. Lack of mobility in Russia and allied air superiority in France, together with political pressures, forced the adoption of a crusts defence. This in turn caused further heavy losses when the crust was broken. What enabled the army to fight so long, so effectively under these circumstances was the adaptability of its organization both for fighting and supply, the technical superiority of much of its equipment and a basic capacity to improvise. The Germans, through sheer necessity were the first modern army to carry out the now fashionable doctrine of minimum manpower, maximum firepower. The average Division at full establishment in 1939 was 15-17,000 men. By 1945 manpower strength of a Division was down to 11-13,000 at full establishment, but its total firepower, particularly in infantry weaponry had actually increased.

W.J.K. Davies, "German Army Handbook 1939-1945", Ian Allan,Ltd., 1973

German Hand Grenades

The best known greanades used by the Nazi war machine during the second World War were the stick grenade (model 24 and PH39) and the egg grenade. There were several other types, but this article will be devoted to these two better known models.

These were originally designed for offensive use, but rely more on concussion and blast than fragmentation. This is obvious due to the thin metal casings. The blast can be lethal, but the usual result was severe shock and anti-moral effects.

The famous "potato masher" (model 24) is composed of an explosive metal head fitted to a wooden handle through the center of which a double length of cord is drewn. One end of the cord is connected by a lead ball to the friction type ignited set. The other end of the cord is attached to a porcelin head or metal ring which ties at the opposite end of the wooded handle in a small housing. This housing is covered by a metal screw cap. To activeate the grenade, all that is necessary is to unscrew the metal cap and pull the China head. This caused a friction whcih ignites the fuze to the dedonator. The fuze has a 5.5 second delay.

The model 24 stick grenade is 14 inches long, weighs 1.25 pounds. The explosive weighs 6 ounces, whcih is quite a charge for a grenade of this weight.

Another popular stick grenade is the Mark PH39. This type is quite similar to the model 24, except it is 2 inches longer and 10 ounces heavier. The delay on the fuze is 4.5 seconds with half a pound more explosive. The cap is directly attached to the china head and works by pulling the cap which in turn pulls the head. This grenade explodes at an approximate distance of 18 yards.

These grenades have a small danger area, but they can be thrown considerable distance. It is necessasary for the thrower to have immediate cover available.

Often the German soldiers would fasten the heads of either 6 PH39s or M24s around a complete stick grenade. This formidable explosive is particulary effective against pill boxes, street fighting and any other strong points

The German smoke greande can be recognized by its similarity to the ordinary H.E. stick grenade, but with the following difference. Instead of the normal field grey explosive head, a smoke head is fitted to the standard handle, and the head is marked with a broken white band near it's base. The letters "Nb" are stancelled on it as well.

The egg grenades used by the Nazis are a dark field grey color with a thin elevated flange around it middle. It is 2 inches in diameter at its thickest point and about 3 inches in length. It weight about .75 pounds. It could be thrown long distances conpared to our WWII grenades.

In the center of the grenade is a pocket which has the no. 8 service pattern detonatior and also contains a 5 second delay flash cap. To ignite the cap, simply unscrew and pull the green knob at the tip of the grenade which fires the flash cap by a wire operating link.

Jack Britton, "German Hand Grenades", Der Haken Kreuz, 1967

The Fallschirmjager Helmet

Fallschirmjager in German is actually three words. They mean, "fall, umbrella and hunter". Combine it and you have a "fighter from the skies".

The Fallschirmjager or Paratrooper wore a different uniform and insignia than the regular ground troops. His helmet also was one of unusual design. It is apparent that it was copied from the standard M35 helmet with the probability of having parts ommitted. The visor and earguards were removed to enable the headgear to be more compact and thus avoiding much of the protrusive parts in air maneuvering.

The necessity of a different strap assembly was provided to prevent the loss of the helmet in the air and also giving more safety to the chin and neck regions from jolts and pressures. This is known as a "chin harness". There were four variations:

1. Early issue was grey leather, backed by chamois on the side that touched the face. It had a quick release buckle of two positions with snaps.

2. A wider but thinner material, grey leather with ersatz (fake) chamois backing and a standard slide buckle.

3. Late issue, very hard leather and instead of the slide straps being sewn, they were riveted on. The harness was much thicker than the first two.

4. Remade harness: After the paratroopers were taken off jump status and used as infantrymen for the duration of the war their helmets were refitted with a D-ring and a standard buckle as the standard German army helmet. These were not as heavy or bulky as the jump issue.

For shock more padding was necessary and special allowances were used in the dome with the support of a rubber lining that ran almost the extent of the interior.This was covered with a leather lining and contained twelve holes for ventilation. The helmets were issued in the following metric sizes; 54, 55,56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61.

Instead of the regular type rivets for securing the liner to the shell, a bolt and nut system was used. This again was for prevention of breakage that could occur in the air. Some examples are known, and some "raw edges" were produced, but otherwise all paratrooper helmets had a "rolled edge". Paratrooper helmets had the silver Luftwaffe insignia on the left side (few examples were produced at the beginning of the war with Wehrmacht insignia) and national colors on the right.

Helmet Covers

1. Cloth helmet cover, blue grey with slots for camouflaging. These were first used on Crete.

2. Two different patterns of camouflage covers being a early issue and late issue. These were the same type as the camoflage smocks (jump suit) held on by clips with slots etc.

3. Chicken wire cover. These were of heavier steel than normal chicken wire. They were sized to the helmet and held on by two clips, one on each side.

4. Net type cover.Large holes in the netting. Liner was removed then net put over the helmet and liner replaced.

5. Mud Covering. Helmets were covered with mud and allowed to dry. This gave the blue-grey helmet more of an earth color.

The 2nd. Fallschirmjager Division that saw service in North Africa, used the standard paratrooper helmet with Luftwaffe decal-insignia. All were painted an Africa Korps tan, by the parachute riggers and personal equipment men of each Regt. They brushed on two or three coats of standard paint that was used on trucks etc. In doing this they covered up the flying eagle insignia. The paint jobs ran from excellent to poor, depending on how rushed they were and the craft-ability of the artist.

Floyd R. Tubbs, "Stahlhelm, Evolution of the German Steel Helmet", Author Published, 1971

Personal Equipment of the Waffen-SS Mountain Troops

Mountain Rifle Regiments and all other Mountain support troops wore an oval black badge bearing a white embroidered Edelweiss with yellow stamen on the right upper sleeve of the field blouse and overcoat. An Edelweiss badge was also worn on the left side of the field cap and the mountain cap, the latter becoming the universal field service cap later in the war and known as the 'Einheitsmiltze'.

As part of the development of the specialist 55-Mountain Divisions crack alpine guides from the mountainous districts of Bavaria and Austria were recruited and given distinctive badges.

Trained in advanced mountain warfare techniques at the Mountain Warfare Schools they wore regulation mountain troop uniform and waffenfarbe but with the addition of a special breast badge. This comprised an oval 55mm high and 43mm wide black cloth badge embroidered with a 2mm wide aluminium cord edge. In the centre was a 33mm (42mm with stalk) aluminium embroidered Edelweiss with gold wire stamen and the lettering "BERGFOHRER" (mountain leader) in aluminium wire in a half circle beneath the flower. In winter guides wore climbing socks and mountain pattern boots and, in summer, shirt sleeves with short pumphosen (leather shorts).

Boots

The original footwear of the Bereitschaften and the SS-VT was the calf length heavy leather boot also worn by the Army and Luftwaffe. These boots were worn in specially tapered trousers. Later ankle boots made without toe caps were also taken into use.

Mountain rifle regiments wore proper climbing boots with specially designed cleated soles with mountaineering studs. Calf length webbing gaiters were also used by these soles with mountaineering studs. Ankle-length webbing gaiters were also used by these specialist divisions. SS Officers usually wore knee length black boots. Mounted units and senior officers wore these boots with nickel plated spurs worn on straps buckled across the instep.

Personal Equipment

The SS-VT and Waffen-SS wore a black leather waistbelt with a special buckle. The officers' buckle was the locket and clasp type and the buckle for the NCOs and other ranks was rectangular. The original pouches were the M1909 pattern. In the various orders of combat dress, two pouches were carried on either side of the buckle. Each pouch was split into three, each section containing ten rounds of rifle ammunition. The waistbelt was 4.5cm wide and was made to slide through loops at the rear of each pouch the centre one of which was fitted with a steel '0' ring through which the braces were looped. The bayonet and the entrenching tool were suspended from frogs on the waistbelt and on the left side. In 1939 the bayonet was being carried over the entrenching tool and suspended by a loop to the entrenching tool's frog. Later it was worn in its own frog in front of the entrenching tool. The M1934 haversack was hung from two loops at the right hip and on it, suspended from a steel '0' ring, and retained by a strap which passed through a loop on the haversack flap was the M1931 water bottle with its oval cup secured over the mouthpiece.

The anti-gas respirator in its cylindrical fluted lightweight metal container was carried on a web strap over the right shoulder the cylinder lying at an angle on the left hip. The bottom attachment to the container was usually hooked to the rear of the belt.

The new pattern braces issued in 1939 consisted of two 4cm wide tapered black straps which passed over the shoulders from the '0' rings on the central pouches and were joined with a steel ring to the 2.5cm wide back strap which descended to fasten to the waistbelt at centre back. There were two large steel 'D' rings fitted to the shoulder straps from which the assault pack or the rucksack could be fitted. A lightweight web yoke could be fitted to the braces from which the assault pack; worn in light field order, could be worn. Full marching order consisted of the M1939 pack mentioned above complete with tent quarter, greatcoat, blankets and clothing bag.

Special pouches were issued concurrently with new weapons, including the MP 43 and MP 44 and the SG 44. These pouches were usually webbing and were carried on the waist belt, diagonally to make withdrawal easier.

Mountain rifle (Gager) regiments were issued with special mountaineering rucksacks and carried larger capacity waterbottles. They also carried various specialised climbing gear including ropes, ice axes, crampons, and in some cases skis, and wore special climbing boots.

The cavalry wore their equipment mainly suspended from the waist belt and were provided with braces which had no yoke fitting. Engineers and Artillery were provided with special rucksacks to provide facilities for their unique functions. The former wore large pouches attached to the fronts of their waistbelts to carry detonators, oval grenades and fuses. These pouches had pouches for rifle ammunition fitted to their sides. The Engineers knapsack carried specialised detonating and smoke equipment. Medical orderlies carried special pouches on their waistbelts for dressings and other medical supplies.

Personal Weapons ;The M 98 and M 43 pattern rifles were carried and later the MP 38, 40, MP 43 and its 43/1, the MP 44 and the St. G. 44. Officers and NCOs carried either the P 08 or the P36 pistol in a black leather holster, officers carrying these weapons or smaller automatic pistols such as the Walther PPK.

The Tent Quarter: This ingenious piece of equipment known in German as the 'Zeltbahn' was a piece of camouflaged (Waffen-SS pattern) waterproof material cut in a triangle with a slit in the material through which the head could pass. It served as a windbreak and could be joined to the three other quarters carried by comrades to form a good tent. On other occasions it served as a poncho and was worn in a variety of ways, the material acting as half-sleeves, or could be rolled to leave the arms free.

Walther-Karl Holzmann, "Waffen-SS Badges, Uniforms, Equipment", Bellona Publications, 1976

German Police Service Dress

Service Dress: This form of dress was worn for street service (Strassendienst), major inspection service (Grosser Aufsichtsdienst), guard service (Wachtdienst) and reporting dress (Meldeanzug),

Shako (Tschako): Prior to the introduction of the 1936 pattern uniform, and the shako in particular, personnel of the Ord- nungspolizei wore the distinctive shako carried over from the Landespolizei. The body was black vulcan fiber (Vulkanfiber) with a black lacquered flat top, and front and back visor with pressed rim. The base of the shako body was with a 18/19mm wide black trim. A 16mm black leather chin strap (enlisted) with matte-white aluminum metal fittings or aluminum metal "scales" (officers) rested on the front visor. Positioned at the front was a large aluminum police national emblem with open wreath at the top. It was affixed to the shako by means of two screw posts, which passed through responding openings with black metal reinforcement in the shako body. The shako shield had a 155mm wingspan, and was cumd to conform to the bend in the body. Centered above the shield was an oval tri-color cockade slotted in a groove, and held in place by an aluminum wire. The cockade measured approximately 62mm high and 36mm wide, and took the form of concentric ovals of rope, five aluminum at the base, one black on top of this, and one aluminum at the very top. The center opening was painted red. The reverse plate was commonly stamped with the manufacturer's code and date of manufacture. Personnel in the rank of Obermeister and above were authorized to wear this cockade made in the same color pattern, but of aluminum wire. The interior top of the shako was usually marked with the manufacturer's logo and size.

A new shako was introduced with the 1936 pattern uniform. It retained the same style and characteristics, but had a police-green uniform cloth covering over the head body. The officer's shield could now be more three-dimensional and highly polished.

Shakos of general officers will be discussed in volume 2.

During the war years, wear of the steel helmet was permitted, especially near the front line, and the shako was worn less.

Tunic (Waffenrock): The Waffenrock was of police-green wool fabric, and dark brown badge cloth collar and cuffs. The collar, top of the cuff, down the left front of the closure, and about the tail panels were piped in light green. The front was secured by eight pebbled aluminum-colored 18mm diameter buttons. The collar was secured by two or three black hooks-and-eyes. Mirror image collar patches, with the background indicating the service branch (light green for Schutzpolizei), were positioned with the leading edge 3mm back from the front collar edge. The two angled pleated patch breast pockets and two hip unpleated straight patch pockets were with scalloped flaps buttoned by 18mm diameter pebbled aluminum-colored buttons. The rear tail panels were with two 18mm diameter pebbled aluminum-colored buttons, the top two serving as belt ramps. The shoulder boards were of the sew-in or slip-on variety, and were secured by 16mm diameter buttons. In the event the shoulder boards were of the slip-on type, there was a strip of tunic fabric sewn horizontal to the sleeve headseam. The police national emblem was worn on the upper left sleeve, while anyone specialty insigne was worn on the lower left. Two parallel aluminum rings, each 10 mm wide, worn above the top of the cuffs, indicated NCOs appointed to the position of company first sergeant (nicknamed "der Spiess"). For details of other insignia, see the respective chapter. The cuffs were normally sewn closed at the rear seam, but tailor preference allowed for an open seam secured by the cuff buttons. With secured cuffs two 18mm pebbled aluminum-colored buttons were positioned at the rear of the front cuff panel. However, when the rear seam was open, the rear of the front panel was with two buttonholes, and the buttons were sewn to the rear of the rear panel. There was a concealed interior pocket on the left breast, and a concealed pocket at each tail panel. Size markings and possible tailor or control marks were commonly found stamped on either the right or left front interior lining.

Wartime tunics could have the side straps fitted with metal hooks passing through the side-seam opening to serve as belt ramps. A light-weight Waffenrock was also authorized for wear.

Neck tie (Halsbinde): Black worn with white collar.

Breeches (Stiefelhose): Standard pattern police green breeches. Riding breeches with reinforced leather seat (Reithose) for mounted personnel.

Gloves (Handschuhe): Grey-green.

Boots (Schaftstiefel): Black leather. Riding boots for mounted personnel.

Spurs (Sporen): Worn by officers only in the rank of Hauptmann and above, and by all mounted officers.

Greatcoat (Mantel): The same pattern greatcoat was worn by all ranks. Rank shoulder boards were of the sew-in variety. No collar patches or police national sleeve insigne were worn. It was of the police-green uniform cloth with brown collar piped in light green. The double-breasted coat was with two vertical rows of six pebbled aluminum-colored (gold for general officers) buttons. The concealed hip pockets were angled-slashed and had rounded unbuttoned flaps. At the left side is a slash for the sword hanger. The sleeve cuffs were indicated by a stitched seam only on privately tailored coats, and by turned-up (un-piped) cuff on issue coats. The collar was closed by a single hook-and-eye, normally backed by a piece of protective cloth. Under the left collar is a cloth tab with buttonhole, and held in place by a single green button. On the right collar was a single green button for securing the opposite tab when the collar was worn closed. At the back was a two-part cloth belt with two pebbled aluminum buttons on the horizontal. A seam ran down the center back, and with a slash from the bottom of the cloth belt down. The slash opening was secured by four evenly spaced buttons. The interior'of the coat was with a concealed slash breast pocket on the left side. A large green button was sewn to the left side to secure the right side of the coat. It was quite common to find size markings and even tailor data stamped inside on the left lining fabric.

Persons authorized to wear a neck decoration were permitted to wear the greatcoat with the top two buttons unbuttoned, and the lapels folded back in order to display the decoration.

Raincoats could be worn in place of greatcoats in wet weather.

Belt (Leibriemen): Black leather with double open-claw silvercolored pebble buckle and shoulder strap for officers. Black leather with aluminum-colored box buckle and rifle three-compartment ammunition pouch on the left side, and black pistol holster on the right side. Mounted personnel were authorized to wear the mounted bandoleer. For details, see coverage of belt buckles in a later volume in this series.

Sidearm: Sword with portepee (for details, see chapter dealing with blade sidearms in a future volume in this series). Pistol with holster (all ranks) worn on the right side.

Medal Bar/Ribbon Bar (Grosse und Kleine Ordensschnalle):
Neck orders and breast stars were also authorized for wear.

Adjutant's Cord (Adjutantenabzeichen): The grey-aluminum cord was authorized for wear by adjutants only. The pattern was identical to that of the police officer's shoulder cord (in turn, identical to the army adjutant's cord), but without the two top cords and with two aluminum cords measuring 15 and 18cm, and with silver-colored metal ferrules at each end. It was worn on the right shoulder of the tunic or greatcoat with the ferrules hanging down at the sleeve seam.

Whistle (Signalpfeife): Worn by all ranks

Handcuffs (Handfessel): Carried only by EM/NCOs

John R. Angolia and Hugh Page Taylor: "Uniforms, Organization & History of the German Police", Volume 1, R. James Bender Pulishing, 2004

www.bender-publishing.com