Frauenschaft Badges - Part 2

The variants of the Leader’s Badges are some what easier to comprehend than the previous sections. In this discussion we are dealing with only two designs, no individual variations. In the 1934-38 Type II design the leader of each Ort, Kreis, Gau and at the Reich level had a badge denoting her esteemed position. The Type II Leader's Badge was a shadow of form of the same series member’s badge bearing the cross pattern. It had a 1.5mm silver outer edging. This decoration was slightly larger than the Staff Badge at 32mm by 33mm. The color scheme for the border was as quoted earlier base metal configuration was a large percentage of silver mixed with smaller portions of nickel washed over copper. The badge characteristics for the Type III Leader’s Badge closely resembled that of the Type III Staff series, though this new leader's design was more distinctive with a 3.5mm wreath of oakleaves, instead of the wide, flat border. This wreath placed oakleaves end to end in a chain on a ribbed background. Base metal for the early 1939 produced badges was silver/nickel but after mid `39 the base was changed to a copper core with silver wash. The badge taped in at 36mm by 36.5mm.

lt must be said the Reich Leader’s Badges in both series are the toughest for collectors to locate. They were worn by the State (Reich) Leader only, and that position did not change hands often during the Reich. The Type III Reich Leader’s Badge is probably rarer than the Type II. Why this is true cannot be determined, but there appears to be more of the second type in circulation today than the III series. In all there were over 9,500 Leader's Badges of all categories manufactured from 1934 to 1944. The leader’s insignia for the State level certainly constituted the smallest category. The number of Reich level badges in collections today can be attributed to the zeal of the manufacturers. An order would be placed for a certain number of specific badges to a given maker. As a course of good business sense he would anticipate orders for still more badges, making and stock piling decorations for future business. This practice was commonplace within the ranks of the medal manufacturers. Goring's Grand Cross of the lron Cross was also reproduced in small numbers by this method of practice.

Golden Badge of Honor of the Nazi Women’s League (Goldenes Ehrenabzeichen der N.S. Frauenschaft)

There exists today in a very few collections an offshoot of the aforementioned Type III Leader`s Badge. For lack of an official title, due to the absence of records, I have called it the Frauenschaft Golden Badge of Honor. Its dimensions are the same as the Type III Leader’s Badge but the outer oakleaf border is golden with the remainder of all metal parts being silver. The exact purpose for these badges is not clear but it is presumed this was a long service award much like the N.S.D.A.P. Golden Party Badge related to old, cherished members of the early organization. This should be considered one of the rarest badges in this enameled organizational field. A very few examples are known to exist but no official mention can be found in German records. It is believed there were fewer than 100, may beconsiderably less, of these badges awarded even though this cannot be officially confirmed. lt is also conjectured that unlike prior badges of this nature, specific award documents were presented with each badge. These Golden Badges of Honor had the outer border washed with a dark gilt coating, while the inner (colored) border was filled in with an off-white enamel. Consider this exceedingly rare!

Badge for Other Colleagues of the Nazi Women’s League (Abzeichen fur andere Kolleginnen der N.S. Frauenschaft)

As its name implies this badge was intended for "other"colleagues, or friends, of the Nazi Women’s League. Meaning that it was given to individuals who routinely gave support, either monetarily or physically, to the cause. Since the age requirements for the league were 18 to 30, membership was not mandatory after the top age bracket. Hence, many women got out but continued to show interest in their local branch .

Designed in 1939 this badge is in one pattern only, that of the Type III series (of `39) lasting until 1944. Measuring 30mm by 31.5mm it was very close in design to the basic member's badge but had to alterations: the title "N.S. Frauenschaft"was not enclosed within a separate section and a colored outer border was also added. This border was color coded as per region of the group. The life rune, swastika, title and trim were all in the base silver with the background in black enamel Copper with an overcoat of silver plate was once again employed. Exact number of these badges produced or given is not known at this time.

Badge for Ex-Members of the Nazi Women’s League (Ehemaligenabzeichen der N.S. Frauenschaft)

This "ex" member’s badge belonged to an elite, albeit small group affiliated with the Frauenschaft. Individuals who had served loyally, made noticeable sacrifices to the league, and were leaving the N.S. Frauenschaft received this badge. It could be likened in award standards and pride to the Meritorious Service Medal given by the Department of Defense to military personnel, usually officers, for exemplary service. To be eligible one had to have joined prior to 1934, and served at least eight years continuous service to the Nazi Women’s League. Membership with another party organ did not count as double like other regulations in the various organizations. Regulations in the Frauenschaft stated that you had to stay with the league only until the age of 30 but many women stayed past this age.

Designed in 1941 this was the last badge to be added to the already vast arsenal of Frauenschaft decorations. Actually,this was more of an award rather than a badge denoting membership or position. An individual had to be recommended by her local leader. The award then had to be approved up the chain to the Reich level.

Produced in one basic type (III) its central theme was that of the same year group Member’s Badges. The title "N.S.Frauenschaft" was enclosed within a silver metal border at the top, with the lettering in black enamel. Surrounding this staple badge was a 1.5mm colored border denoting level of service that the individual had worked. This does not mean in a staff position necessarily, as clearly marked coded borders on staff badges, but rather to show they had been, say, at the Gau level for their term of service. However, it should be noted that staff personnel were the usual recipients of this remembrance. In his book "Uniforms and Badges of the Third Reich,Vol. 1: N.S.D.A.P." author Rudolf Kahl describes this badge as having a yellow central field as opposed to the example here having a black center. This author’s research, and the badge shown, appears to point to this design as the norm. Many others have been noted with this color scheme. Kahl's badge, as mentioned in his text, would seem to be a 1. Proto-type, 2).variant, or 3. a special badge for ex-members at the Reich level. Specifications for this Ex-Member’s Badge are 34.5mm by 34.5mm. Badges produced from 1941-43 were copper centered with nickel/silver plate. Those made in 1944, the few that were, were zinc with a nickel alloy overlay with paint instead of enamel. Though more women technically were eligible for award of this badge it was actually only received by slightly over 12,000 before the end of the war. This figure is remarkable considering it was in existence for 3 1/2 to 4 years. Collectors should consider this item at any level scarce to come by in today’s market.


Planned in 1938, and put into gear in ’39 the Deutsches Frauenwerk was a parallel splinter group of the N.S. Frauenschaft. It was formed basically as a voluntary group for the working members of the Frauenschaft, or those who wished to do some type of community aid (or factory work for that matter). By this time, however, a major percentage of the women were working. Political ideologies were strengthened through the German Women’s Work. During the last five years of the Reich there was only one type of badge for this organization produced. lt employed the same blue print as the Type III Frauenschaft Member`s Badge utilizing the life rune and mobile swastika on a black field. Across the top metal border were the words "Deutsches Frauenwerk". Its measurements were 30mm by 31mm, and was manufactured with a copper metal core plated with nickel/silver. In 1944 paint replaced all enamel areas, and the base metal turned to zinc. In all there were over 800,000 of these badges produced providing substantial evidence that the Deutsches Frauenwerk was politically a very strong organization. A slight difference should be made between this and the same design Frauenschaft Member’s Badge. The mobile swastika on the Deutsches Frauenwerk was slightly smaller, and less defined than on its counterpart. This badge also used the spring pin/catch system.

German W0men’s Order Badge(Abzeichen des Deutscher Frauenorden)

Prior to the formation of the N.S. Frauenschaft in 1933 the women of Germany were already organizing into small units known as the "Frauenorden", or German Women’s Order. Brought together very early in 1932 the Frauenorden was purely a political tool for the teachings of Hitler, and the dissemination of National Socialist dogma. Membership in theFrauenorden was totally voluntary though restricted to those over 18 years old. The badge worn by members of this very early N.S.D.A.P. offshoot was a large triangular brooch measuring approximately 40mm by 44mm. Its design was that already described of the Type II Frauenschaft Member’s Badge: white enamel cross on a black enamel background, with top cross bar housing the title "Deutscher Frauenorden". This wording, cross, swastika, and trim were all in the base gilt plated copper.

Since this appeared in the early years of the state the RZM code should not be found on the Deutscher Frauenorden insignia, as it did on almost all other Frauenschaft league badges in later years. It may or may not carry the maker's stamp, and/or Ges. Gesch. lt may be worth noting that the manufacturer's trademarks for these pre-33 years in many cases are different, more complex than in later times. The firm Assman had a very complex hallmark on some early badges of four or five characters. As previously described the common spring pin/catch suited this design well.

This organization, formed in 1933 along with the parent Frauenschaft, was short-lived for its usefullness was lost with several other groups being formed. It initially was started as a girls organization of the Nazi Women’s League. Membership was voluntary for ‘those who already belonged to the JM or BdM. The badge design adopted by this little known organization was a carry through of the Frauenorden style. "N.S. Madchen-schaft" replaced the top banner across this rare badge. Size specifications are unknown. All metal parts were gilt plated over copper as on so many of the other early Frauenschaft badges. This badge would also probably not be RZM marked but would almost assuredly have the spring pin/catch on the reverse. This particular organization was done away with in late 1935 due to the general lack of membership, and direction from the party. The small number of members, and the short life span would point to very few of these badges being produced labeling this a very rare item for anyone to acquire.

J.R. Cone, "One People, One Reich - Enameled Organizational Badges of Germany 1918-1945", MCN Press, 1983

Frauenschaft Badges, Part 1

Nazi Women’s League and German W0men’s Work (National-Sozialistische Frauenschaft und Deutsches Frauenwerk)

Probably two of the most complex, and misunderstood organizations of the Nazi regime were the N.S. Frauenschaft and the Deutsches Frauenwerk. The N.S. Frauenschaft was formed in 1933 following Hitler's rise to power but did not get much steam for about a year. This league was the propaganda spearhead to bring Nazi ideals to the German girls and women. It encompassed all of the lesser female groups like the BDM and JM, as well as the Frauenwerk (in later years). Members of the Frauenschaft spread the teachings on everything from motherhood to domestic affairs and business. Membership was mandatory for all women from 18 to 30 years of age.

The Deutsches Frauenwerk was created in 1938 and put into service the following year. Realizing that Germany was about to become involved in a major world conflict Hitler knew that replacements would be necessary for the male workforce that was about to go to war. It was obvious that women would have to be used to fill the gaps where men had once worked. Though the Frauenschaft was under the direction of the N.S.D.A.P., and the Frauenwerk hid underneath the skirts of the Frauenschaft, the Women’s Work Force was allowed to remain somewhat independent of the mother organization. Members of the Frauenschaft joined the Deutsches Frauenwerk if they were part of the industrial working populace, though membership was voluntary in the Women's Work. The leadership and staff of this group were picked from the main ranks of the Frauenschaft, hence, there are no specific Frauenwerk Leader’s Badges and the like.

The resultant badges that were struck have proved to be confusing for today’s historian and collector because of the multitude of types, styles and shapes. There were decorations for just about everyone in and out of the Frauenschaft organization. As a hard rule the main badges discussed in this section of the text went through three basic design changes.

All badges referred to were produced:

Type I — 1933

Type II — 1934 until 1938

Type III — 1939 until 1944

The differences among the many types and variants will be discussed in the ensuing pages.

The badges signified quite adequately the rank structure of the league. All staff and leader’s badges were produced to immediately identify the level of responsibility of the wearer. The colored outer border surrounding the general badge motif was coded for specific geographical locations:


Blue —- Orts (Locality or city)

Black (Type II)

White (Type III) —— Kreis (District)

Red — Gau (Province)

Yellow —— Reichs (State)

This color scheme was also carried out in the D.A.F. female badges, and most probably by the N.S.K.O.V., although the latter is unclear.

The information presented herein will hopefully clear up many of the tangled misunderstandings about the badges that represented these women’s leagues. For specific reference purposes, and to formulate a common language among the collecting society, collectors and dealers alike should refer to a badge as specifically and accurately as possible: "Type II Staff Badge for Gau Level", etc.

Member’s Badges of the Nazi W0men’s League(Abzeichen fur Mitglieder der N.S. Frauenschaft)


As stated in the short preamble to this section the basic member's badge of the Nazi’s League went through three basic design changes.

Type I of 1933, the only year this was produced, was 23.5 mm in diameter, and was a virtual copy of the N.S.D.A.P. party badge. The only difference being the wording on the outer border of "Frauenschaft N.S.D.A.P." in lieu of the Nazi party inscription. There was also a slight variant to this badge that used "Nat. Soz. Frauenschaft" instead of the former verse. The metal base was a high quality silver/nickel composition. Almost all of these badges were made by “‘Osang-Dresden", though there may have been a very small number of other makers. The total number of these badges made is not known.

Type II utilized an entirely different enamel altogether. lt had a new triangular shape specifically created to be worn by a woman as a brooch on the collar or lapel. Its measurements were 25.5mm by 27mm. The design carried a central white enamel cross on a black enamel field. A horizontal red enamel swastika was in the center. On the left and right arms, as well as the bottom leg of the cross were the letters "G", "H".and "L". It is not known what these particular letters stood for, since they appear to have no relation to the title of the organization. "Nat. Soz. Frauenschaft" was imprinted in metal letters across the top of the badge inside of a white enamel banner. The basic metal of this badge was copper plated with a gilt wash. Lettering, cross, swastika and outer edging were all in this gilt metal. It should be noted that there were variants of this badge that are twice the size of the basic member’s Type II, and less than half the given measurements (see above). These were separate purchase items from the league.

The same shape was retained in the Type III Member’s Badge but a new design was added. A "life rune" replaced the white cross on the Type II. This symbol looked very similar to a legless stickman. A mobile swastika was placed at the top of the rune. The top enamel banner was replaced with a metal one surrounding the title "N.S. Frauenschaft". All words were in red enamel. Note the difference in the group`stile in this Type III as opposed to the II style. The title was somewhat shortened to just "N.S .... " instead of "Nat". The basic background of this 31mm by 31.5mm badge was black enameling.

Badges produced in 1939 to 1940 of the Type III series were nickel, but after this date until 1944 the base was copper with nickel overlay. The top banner, life rune, mobile swastika and outer trim were all in base metal silver. There were only two sizes of this item made during wartime Germany. The standard size has already been noted, with the smaller size being 23.5mm by 23.5mm, about 2/3 size. This Type III Member’s Badge and the Deutsches Frauenwerk were the same shape and design (with the titles being all dirrerent). and both had smaller like insignia. Badges produced in 1944 were of painted familia on zinc metal.

Type I Frauenschaft Member’s Badge was producedin 1933; Type II was in effect from 1934 to 1938; the Type III produced from 1939-44. All N.S. Frauenschaft badges were produced under strict Reich guidelines since this league was an officially touted group under the N.S.D.A.P. Each badge struck had the RZM quality stamp, and was almost always maker marked with the companies' "M" series code (M1/72etc.). All had the standard spring pin/catch on the reverse, some being vertical, others horizontal. As a general rule all badges were slightly convex in shape although this cannot be a point of authentication.

I have one Type II Leader's Badge that appears to be avariant. It is flat instead of convex, the red enamel swastika is slightly smaller, the RZM marking is somewhat larger with only one circle where most have two, and the maker’s logo is larger than normal. The base metal, however, says this is a pre-45 piece though this particular badge may have been a test strike by a company that never received a state contract. As such they never went into mass production. Here again the point is made that only a collector’s experience, expertise, and gut feeling can really determine originality of a questionable badge.

Staff Badges of the Nazi W0men’s League (Mitarbeiter-Abzeichen der N.S. Frauenschaft)

In 1934 as the N.S. Frauenschaft grew, N.S.D.A.P. officials put together a complex system of ranks and offices. Cities were banded together into "Kreise" (districts), and these were incorporated into "Gaue" (provinces). In all there were 34 provinces within Germany. Women of the Frauenschaft formed groups in each community, or "Ort". Each of these local organizations had leaders appointed to key positions such as treasurer, chief, etc. by the state. A central office in each Kreis oversaw the business of the individual towns, and another central office governed the entire province. There was, as one might expect, a head office at the Reich level.

Each officer of these geographical districts received a special Staff Badge in honor of her position in the league. The group’s leader received another type of badge, which we will discuss shortly. Staff Badges in all levels were identical except for an outer 1.5mm colored border signifying the particular level of each official. In the preamble you can find the color codes of the Frauenschaft league, as well as the segmenton DAF Female Badges.

During the span of the Third Reich there were two distinct versions of the Staff Badges for the Nazi Women’s League.Type II adopted in 1934 had the same cross and triangular design as the Type II Member’s Badge. This Staff Badge measured 30mm by 31mm, just slightly larger than the Member"s badge of the same series. As pointed out above, the brightly colored enamel border or "Aussenrand" in German, indicated to other league members the level of the wearer in the organization. Each badge was RZM’d and hallmarked.

One small difference between the Staff Badge and the standard Member's Badge was the metal base. Staff Badges had asilver/nickel base in the Type II series from 1934 until about 1936. Thereafter, the Type II Staff was produced with a copper metal core and silver outer plate. This copper core/silverwash was carried through to the Type III. But all Type II (andType III) Staff Badges had the silver color on all metal parts. Remember, the Type II Member’s Badge was copper with gilt wash? Well, the Staff Badges changed that for the rest of the organizational insignia for the group.

When the Type III Staff Badges were born on the designer’s sketch pad. and mass produced from 1939 to 1944, a new rank system was devised to allow for better representation of each office through the badges. There was now a Staff Badge for the "Wider" staff (heads of departments, etc.), and one for the "Closer" Staff (direct officers of the league). The Type III Wider Staff Badge was slightly different from the same series Members decoration. Since this was wartime, a German army type eagle was sat atop the central life rune, and the top banner eliminated with the wording clad against the black enamel background. The words and eagle/swastika were in silver. Surrounding this design was the 1.5 mm level border with a thin silver outside edge. This edge is the key difference between the wider and closer insignia. Measurements of the Wider Staff Badge were 30.5mm by 30.5mm. The base metal was silver/nickel plate over copper but in 1944 this was switched to nickel over zinc core.


The insignia of rank for the Type III Closer Staff Badge was identical to the previously described badge, except for the lmm wide silver border. It was almost the same size at 30.5mm by 31mm. Once again the base was copper with nickel/silver plate. All Staff Badges have the maker’s M serial mark on the reverse. The Type II was made with a horizontal spring pin/catch, while the Type III badges were produced with vertical assemblies. No statistics were kept of the numbers presented or produced from 1934 to 1944.

To be continued...

J.R. Cone, "One People, One Reich - Enameled Organizational Badges of Germany 1918-1945", MCN Press, 1983

The RZM and the SA

The RZM (Reichzeugmeisterei) was the regulatory agency which governed the manufacture and sale of all Political insignia, uniforms and uniform equipment for the various Parly Organizations. The RZM controlled licensing and design specifications for the numerous manufacturers and sales facilities. The RZM itself did little actual construction of insignia. This was limited primarily to the development of Muster (construction examples) for the manufacturing firms. It should be noted, however, that even the construction of Muster was usually contracted out to a highly reputable firm with the actual work receiving final approval from the RZM. Original Muster insignia issued by the RZM is difficult to find and is a fine addition to any collection. RZM Muster insignia should have a specific tag marking it as such. For example, a set of collar tabs constructed as a Muster would normally be attached with a multicolored cord fastened together by a round metal seal approximately one half inch in diameter. The seal displayed the RZM logo on one side and an item code number or description on the other. The Muster tags can also found in cloth and in paper variations depending on the type of insignia involved.

Primary manufacturers were required to place RZM tags (normally paper) on each item which they manufactured under RZM specifications. The tag indicated the firms RZM number, individual tag number, and license cost. The license cost was designated by the color of printing on the tag and also by a letter code on later tags.

The placement of the RZM labels on the insignia was also regulated. It was a requirement that a label be placed on each piece of insignia which was produced. Despite the rules it was common practice for the RZM label to be attached only to the left collar tab when a pair was completed and only one tag to a pair of shoulder boards. The following photos are provided to give the collector an idea of the general appearance and placement of the RZM labels on SA insignia.

David Fuller,"Collectors Guide to Sturmabteilung Insignia", Postal Instant Press, 1985

Diplomatic Corps Dagger Knot

Subject of much talk and speculation the dagger for the Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories comes up again and again. Hoping to shed some credence on the dagger, hanger and knot the following information should be of great value to the collector/researcher.

The standard State service dagger in gold, with hanger straps of gold braid was projected for use by Eastern Officials in 1941. The hanger fittings were also gold.

The portepee to be worn with this dagger is said to be the standard version long cord of aluminum for officer grades however, the ball is smaller than the standard version.

In 1942 the special Eastern Official's dagger came into use, along with a completely new uniform. This is the prescribed dagger in Dienstkleidungsvorschift fur den Geschaftsbereich des Reichministeriums fur die besetzten Ostgebiete ( Service Dress Regulations for the Departmentof the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territories) dated 1942. The portepee for this particular dagger is said to be the standard aluminum one. The hangers have fabric straps with yellow facings and velvet backing.

Some new and very interesting information concerning the often misunderstood and confusing dagger for the Nazi government officials has come to light via Mr. C. R. Davis a well-known collector of Eastern Territories memorabilia. His source of information concerning this subject is an original source: Uniformvorschrift des Reichminister des Innern zum Erlass des Fuhrers un Reichskanzlers uber die Einfuhrung einer Beamtenuniform ( "Uniform Regulations from the Reich Secretary of the Interior for Release by the Fuhrer and Reich Chanellor Concerning the Introduction of an Official's uniform) dated 1940. This particular document describes (not illustrates) the standard State Service dagger as strictly silver. No mention is made of a gold design, A silver knot is mentioned but the hangers are not described.

Beschreibung des Grauen Tages - Dienstanzunges des Auswartigen Amtes ("Description of the Grey Day-Service-Dress of the Foreign Office'') gives the following details concerning the Diplomatic daggers. Hanger and knot style depended on the rank of the wearer. No mention is made of a ''gold'' dagger. The description in each case is silver. Also, no mention is made of a gold knot. The Diplomatic ranks (service grades) were divided into four levels:

"Beamte des Horeren Dienstes" (Official of top level service): Had some 20 ranks within it. Of these 20 ranks, the top four grades wore a silver dagger and knot with gold hangers that had gold fittings. The remaining ranks wore the same dagger and knot but on a silver hanger which had gold fittings.

"Beamte des mittleren Dienstes" (Official of upper middle level service) had 9 grades. They all wore the silver dagger and knot on a silver hanger which had silver fittings.

"Beamte des mittleren Dienstes" (Official of middie level service) wore the same hanger fittings knot and dagger as those officials listed in Number 2 above.

"Beamte des einfachen Dienstes" (Official of lower level service) has three ranks. These wore the silver dagger with a black and silver knot. The hangers were black leather straps with silver fittings.

Since several different ways of wrapping the portepee have been observed in original source photographs there does not seem to be an "official" manner of affixing the portepee on the dagger.

The knot that was wrapped around the guard lower part of the handle and crossguard of the Diplomatic official's Degen had the following pattern: A cloth strap having two silver stripes on each edge, a pock pattern between these stripes. The slide, stem, crown and ball were all made of aluminum braid (see page 168 Volume I Johnson).

Heinrich Kreutz, Rolf Hofmann, Thomas M. Johnson, J. Rex Reddick, "Edged Weapon Accouterments of Gemany 1800-1945, Reddick Enterprises, 2002

johnsonreferencebooks.com

Collecting Gau Badges

The Nazi Party administration was divided into four levels, Reich (National), Gau (State, Region or Province), Kreis (District) and so on through Orts, Zelle and Block. Every year each Gau would hold a ''Gautag'' or, you might say, Province Day. This was like a small version of the National Reichsparteitag. There were lots of speeches, parades, meetings and more speeches. To help pay the cost of holding the event, and to generally fatten the Party coffers, it was common practice to create a badge commemorating the day and sell them for a small amount to visitors. The badges were bought by virtually everyone attending and were worn during the day to show support for the party. At the end of the day many people kept the badges as a remembrance. Today collectors commonly refer to these type badges as tinnys.

Unlike the Reichsparteitag badges of which you can find only about 10 different, Gautag badges are varied and many. Some simple arithmetic will give you an idea. There were 43 Gau, and from 1933 to 1939 they each created a yearly Gautag badge, that would be 301 different badges. Some Gau created badges earlier than 1933 and some may have started later, I don't think there is any complete record. Suffice it to say there are several hundred different.

These badges offer some interesting collecting challcnges. A collector could decade to acquire one of each. This would be difficult because some would prove to be scarce or impossible to acquire and because of the lack of documentation he would never really know when he had them all. Another way of doing it would be to collect only certain Gaus or specific years, such as the last year of issue (which in most cases would be 1938 or 1939, as donation badges or all types were seldom struck during the war). One idea that I think would be interesting, would be to frame a large map of Germany showing all the Gaus and to get one badge from each Gau and affixit to the proper location on the map. Other collections could be built by acquiring only those made with certain design features (like eagles), only those made of tin, ceramic, plastic,l eather or whatever. The possibilities are endless.

Which ever way a collector decides to approach it building this type of collection can have several advantages. First: these badges are readily available and several different ones can usually be found at any militaria show. Second: there are so many different ones that the problem of not being able to add something new to the collection would not come up for quite a while. Third: most Gautag badges are relatively inexpensive. Unlike collecting medals or combat badges, which quickly requires you to spend hundreds or thousands for each new piece. Gautag badges are usually priced from ten dollars to less than one hundred dollars each, with (I would estimate) an average price of about twenty-five to fifty dollars. Finally when you get a good collection of Gautag badges you can start collecting Kreistag badges. I figure there should be at least 6,000 different ones of those.

Bob Treend, "Collecting Gau Badges", Der Gauleiter, 1991

Duane Pfister

Photography and Militaria

It's said a picture is worth a thousand words and nothing could be more true. That's why so much space is devoted to pictures in catalogs, books and just about every other media used to sell something. I see a lot of really bad photos on our web site so I thought I would write this little article to maybe help someone.

If you're selling militaria on the internet then photos of the pieces should be considerd an absolute must. And taking it a step further, "good" photos....

Years ago in the "olden days" of Der Gauleiter I offered an auction service for several years. This required that I photograph the pieces for the catalog (and develope and print and diddle with them. Thank God for digital photography!) I was able to learn a few things about shooting pics of militaria and thought I would pass them along for what they're worth.

There are several things you have to consider when taking your pics. The ones that seem to cause most people to screw up are lighting, focus, exposure and composition. All seem simple enought but it just ain't so. Forutnately with todays digital cameras you can just keep trying till you get it right... no wasting film and developing to see your results. You see what you got at once and just shoot again if it doesn't look right. There's really is no reason not to have good photos of your stuff.

Lighting: First you have to have "enough", then you need to know how to use it. What you have to look out for is shadows. These can really make it hard for someone to pick our details in a photo. You can use lights; professional lights are best but it you don't want to spend a lot, and you really don't have to, try this. I've use a pair of clip on type work lights that I got at an auto supply store. I put one on each side of the piece and balanced them to eliminate shadows. Another trick that works very well is to shoot the pics outdoors on an overcast day. If you can stand ourside in the daytime and not see your own shadow, you're in business. You can get great pics with no shadows at all. A flash seldom works well unless you "bounce" it.

Focus: This seems obvious but it's surprising how many people will mess up. I notice that it's usually because they tried to get too close to the item and their camera won't focus at that short distance. Having the piece a little smaller in the pic is better than having it out of focus. And as a side note... many collectors think that an out of focus pic is the sign of someone trying to pass a fake.

Exposure: This goes along with lighting. Make sure the picture is bright enough to see the details of the piece. If it comes out too dark then shoot it again. Adjust your camera or lights to get a good shot.

Composition: Don't try to be "artistic". You're not shooting pics for an art magazine! You're trying to show the buyers exactly what you've got, nothing more. Just straight forward shots are best. And watch that background. No one wants to be distracted by a lot of clutter behind the piece. Shoot on as plain a background as you can.

Finally, even the best shots can use some "tweeking". After you shoot the pics it's always a good idea to make some final adjustments. You can use a photo program to do this. I use Paint Shop Pro 5 and it's great. I can adjust the brightness, contrast, crop and just about anything else that needs to be done before I publish the pic.

Doing it right really takes no more time than doing it wrong. Good pics will make your ad look better and increase your sales. It's worth it. You can also find some tips on photos in our web site's HELP section.

Bob Treend, "Photography and Militaria", Militaria Blog, 2009

The German Army - Historical Background

It is probably safe to say that the German regular army was, in 1939, the most efficient national fighting force in the world. This was not necessarily because of its oft-quoted superiority of equipment, which was partly a propaganda myth that worked; the standard and really efficient equipment was in general only in small scale use right up to the end of the 1940 French campaign and even later. It was due more to the tradition of militarism in the German nation, a tradition that ensured even in peace time an excellent and forward-looking General Staff and an army and population whose patriotism, and hence their military morale, could be easily stirred; and to the above-mentioned propaganda element which gave extra strength to the advanced tactics that were being adopted. The exaggerated accounts of the opening campaign against Poland in 1939 hid the fact that the successful Blitzkrieg (lightning war) had been achieved with quite ordinary equipment for the period, and thus helped to confuse and dishearten the opposition when the same tactics were used in France the following year. French equipment then, especially in armor, was in many ways superior to equivalent German machines but the army organization was ineffective against the superb staff work and unexpected tactics of the Germans.

The basis of this military machine can be traced back to traditions of conscription and militarism, well before even the First World War, when the German General Staff never really thought of the army as having been defeated. This attitude, together with the resentment engendered by the Versailles treaty that among other things severely restricted weapons and armed forces, gave a boost to militarism that was showing results even before Hitler came to power in I933. With hindsight it would seem that the Versailles restrictions on armament in particular did much to pressure Germany into developing technically advanced equipment and tactics so that when the time came, an efficient army could be produced at short notice.

In consequence, through the late 1920s and early 1930s, in all arms basic equipment was being developed in civilian guises without the handicap of having to conserve existing material - the old story of the German worker who stole perambulator parts and found that on assembly they kept coming out as a machine gun, had more than a grain of truth in it. Certainly "commercial" car and lorry chassis turned suspiciously easily into military cross-country vehicles, while more potent weapons were actually developed and tested fairly openly in neighbouring countries. Thus when Hitler came to power and declared the creation of a revived armed services (die Wehrmacht) comprising das Heer(Army); die Luftwaffe (Air Force); die Kriegsmarine (Navy) the basic work had already been done in many cases. True, the development of battle tanks had been slowest as had the development of artillery - they were big things to hide in the finished form - but other equipment was almost ready for production.

Unfortunately the General Staff and the propaganda branch let themselves be carried away by their ideals. In 1936, for example the Einheits or standard vehichle programme provided for construction of a whole range of elaborate troop supply and weapons carriers most of which had cross-country capability and all of which were very expensive. It became rapidly obvious that to provide even the limited striking forces required by the new tactics would take far too long and be far too costly. A rapid revaluation had to be undertaken and in 1938 Colonel von Schell pushed through a revised equipment programme that drastically simplified army procurement and introduced common elements in both civilian and army vehicles.

Organisation and planning, on the other hand was not seriously inhibited by post-war restrictions and was pushed ahead urgently all through the inter-war period. Untouched by the "allied" concept of apparently preparing for the next war on the lines of the last, the German General staff seized on the ideas of the British Captain Liddel Hart who was advocating the development of armoured striking forces as the spearhead of an army. His concept was of the "expanding torrents", the smashing hammerblow through an enemy front by masses of armour and mobile infantry which protected its flanks simply by its own speed and by the disorganization it caused. The Germans developed this into the Blitzkrieg system which added to the tanks and infantry a force of ground attack aircraft to co-operate closely with the army and help to clear the way for the spearhead.

The thinking was sound; the snag was that, even with simplified equipment programmers German industry could not produce nearly enough offensive equipment to meet the army's needs. The original plan was for 63 armoured (Panzer) Divisions; at the end of 1939 there were but ten and in 1945 therewere only some 36, while it was impossible to keep even these fully equipped. Hence the Blitzkrieg concept virtually dictated the formation of the rest of the army. Apart from a limited number of motorized infantry divisions to back up the panzers, all infantry formations would have to rely mainly on horse drawn transport, being carried and supplied by rail over long distances. It was conordered that this was not of great importance since they were intended only as fairly static units, mopping up after the short sharp panzer war and garrisoning occupied districts. Time invalidated this theory but only because the blitzkrieg, while winning major battles, did not in Russia provide the short sharp war it was intended to do.

Nonetheless, none of this was apparent in 1939. The political side is not relevant here except where it affected the army as a fighting machine but it had by then contributed in several ways to army tactical efficiency. One major one was in the annexation of Czechoslovakia which, from the military point of view, provided mobilization practice and an efficient battle-tank to stop the gap until home-developed machines come along! More than a quarter of the tanks used in the 1940 French campaign were of Czech design. It had also, however, already started to reduce the independent decision-making power of the General Staff, a tendency that was eventually to subordinate military policy directly to the control of Hitler, and eventually to embarrass the army in many ways.

In the field, initially the Blltzkneg worked. With crushlng air superlority and the unexpected tactics of the lightning war, first the Poles in Autumn 1939 and then the French and British eight months later were caught unprepared and decisively defeated on land. The German army found itself master of western Europe with a reputation for high fighting power and advanced equipment. The paucity of such equipment was not noticed and the success in some part seems to have hidden its lack even from the German political leaders.

During the ensuing year, much improved equipment, both light and heavy, was in fact coming into service The main battle tanks Types III and IV, new infantry weaponry and tactics based upon the lessons learn were ready for the major turning point of the war - the opening of the Russian front in June 1941. Although it exposed Germany to that constant General Staff nightmare, a war on two major fronts, at first this appeared a feasible operation. The panzer tactics and the sweeping outflanking movements worked; the opposition was driven back in great leaps and bounds. But it also very soon revealed the two basic weaknesses that defeated the German army.

Firstly, it became quickly evident that production capacity was not sufficient to equip properly the rapid expansion made necessary by the vast distances of Russia; a situation made worse by operations in the Balkans and in Africa which drained off further resources. The non-mobile infantry Divisions in particular proved a considerable handicap and the Russian winter of 1941-2 showed up a new weak link - unpreparedness to face extremely low temperatures. The wastage in vehicles, equipment and men was enormous and continual. The Blitzkrieg for the first time failed and in doing so sealed the final military defeat.

Secondly the strictly military control of operations was over. Even during the summer of 1941, central OKH control had grown so weak that individual army group commanders were interfering in the strategic planning by initiating operations on their own; OKH was really emasculated when on December 19, 1941, Hitler took over direct command of the army and increasingly interfered in its activities. While the offensives were taking place this was not quite so serious but once, from late 1942 on, the army was forced on to the defensive on all fronts, its effects both on efficiency and morale became extremely serious. Hitler developed an obsession about not giving up ground which lost vast quantities of men and material that the army could not spare; Germany had only a very limited potential in a long war and such epic disasters as Stalingrad and Tunis where whole armies of 100,000 men and more were lost complete with their equipment were largely irremediable so far as army strength was concerned. In addition his reaction to the 'independence' of the Russian front generals was to tie their hands by far too detailed orders which often could not take into account the actual circumstances in the field.

Here the political side of the war machine was a crippling handicap to the better field commanders, as it was in the rise of the 'private armies' formed by various factions within the Nazi regime. The most well-known of these was the Waffen-SS (Schutzstaffel) the armed branch of the Nazi Party's own force. From 1943 on, the best equipment, the best fighting men, the most regular supplies, were directed into this army which totalled over 38 Divisions by the war's end. At its best it was an effective fighting force second to none, but for the army command it had serious disadvantages.

First and foremost its field commanders always had a direct line of communication to Nazi headquarters and hence to OKW - the supreme command of the Wehrmacht; there was always a struggle for control in the field so that army commanders could never entirely assimilate SS units within their commands. Secondly; its loyalty eventually was to its creator Heinrich Himmler and to Hitler, not to the army General staff. Thirdly; in its creator's quest for power it soon included a number of almost completely useless Divisions sometimes known as the joke SS or Byzantine SS, composed almost entirely of foreign nationals and criminals some of whom fought well but many of whom could be guaranteed to desert at the first opportunity; yet they still had to be employed in war and they still consumed valuable equipment.

On a lesser scale the same can be said for the field Divisions hastily formed during 1943-45, from redundant Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel. They were not trained to the standard of regular divisions, their equipment was not so good, and their former masters were always trying to keep some measure of control. Even the Volksturm, the last-ditch home guard that was blown up out of all proportion for political reasons by Martin Bormann - who wanted his own army - diverted some effort and equipment. As several commentators have said, it was a wonder that the poor regular army ever got any replacements at all!

On the credit side, however, political pressure had some rationalizing effect on development and production. From 1942 on, new and for its period very advanced, equipment began to reach the field, though never in sufficient quantity. Despite their teething troubles the new tanks, guns, infantry carriers and light infantry weapons were superior in design to equivalent allied equipment and it was only this superiority of designs coupled to the still efficient military machine and the resilience of the average German soldier, that enabled the army to fight on for so long. For, from the time of the successful allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the original defects of the Army ensured its eventual destruction.

Firstly, the basic lack of resources was emphasized by an ever increasing allied superiority in the air and an apparently inexhaustible allied source of equipment and manpower. If the Germans lost a thousand men or fifty tanks - or, more importantly, a fuel or ammunition dump - it was very difficult to replace them, especially as four fronts were calling for help. If the allies lost 1oo tanks another 1oo appeared as if by magic. Then, too, allied air superiority invalidated the German strategic defence pattern that had been forced on them by the split between mobile and largely immobile Divisions. On the western front, with rail traffic disrupted by air strikes, they could no longer easily move the horse drawnin fantry Divisions and had to rely on a crust defence backed by barely adequate mobile reserves. Yet allied air power also seriously hampered the mobility of these reserves. Petrol stores dropped rapidly and even heavy armour could not move safely in daylight. Thus even the panzer and motorized units, bled of much equipment for the Russian front, were drawn into the crust defence. It was a very hard crust to crack as the allies found at Caen and at Monte Casino, but once it broke there was little to hold advancing troops and, of more importance much equipment had to be abandoned through lack of transport. Matters were not made easier for the tactical commanders by Hitler's continued demands not to give ground, since it was then largely impossible to build up reserve lines or to conduct a proper strategic withdrawal.

On the Russian front, air superiority was never such a problem but the extremes of climate and the vast distances handicapped the German army in much the same way. There was never enough mobile transport or battle equipment and what there was wore out quickly. In the circumstances the German withdrawal was a good piece of tactical fighting since, until the Russians used Blitzkrieg tactics themselves in overwhelming strength in 1945, some sort of a front line was always maintained.

Perhaps the most amazing thing about the German army in fact is that, despite political interference, its losses and the impossibility of ever meeting its needs, it remained a cohesive organization up to the end of the war. This was partly helped by the increasingly strict combing out of civilian workers to supply manpower needs and by the staggering capacity of German industry to maintain high production totals even under the allied bombing. Nonetheless it was a considerable feat to be able to raise a mobile counter attack force of the size and quality that tried to burst through the Ardennes in December 1944. That the gamble failed through, almost inevitable the German weaknesses of political interference, lack of fuel and the superior capacity of the allied forces especially in the air, does not conceal the basic feat.

In summery, the German army in the 1939-45 war suffered from the startb y inadequate supplies of men and material. This would not have been vital had the Blitzkrieg philosophy always won campaigns instead of only major battles. But the Russian Blitzkrieg failed. From that time on the army was committed to a long drawn-out struggle on several fronts with inadequate mobility to maintain its front lines. The manpower and equipment situation was gravely worsened by political interference which threw away whole armies for militarily unsound reasons and this problem was compounded when the additional front was opened by the Allied Invasion of Europe. Lack of mobility in Russia and allied air superiority in France, together with political pressures, forced the adoption of a crusts defence. This in turn caused further heavy losses when the crust was broken. What enabled the army to fight so long, so effectively under these circumstances was the adaptability of its organization both for fighting and supply, the technical superiority of much of its equipment and a basic capacity to improvise. The Germans, through sheer necessity were the first modern army to carry out the now fashionable doctrine of minimum manpower, maximum firepower. The average Division at full establishment in 1939 was 15-17,000 men. By 1945 manpower strength of a Division was down to 11-13,000 at full establishment, but its total firepower, particularly in infantry weaponry had actually increased.

W.J.K. Davies, "German Army Handbook 1939-1945", Ian Allan,Ltd., 1973